Interpreting mega-development projects as territorial traps: the case of irrigation schemes on the shores of Lake Chad (Borno State, Nigeria) by Bertoncin, Marina & Pase, Andrea
Geogr. Helv., 72, 243–254, 2017
https://doi.org/10.5194/gh-72-243-2017
© Author(s) 2017. This work is distributed under
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. su
pp
or
te
d 
by
Interpreting mega-development projects as territorial
traps: the case of irrigation schemes on the shores of
Lake Chad (Borno State, Nigeria)
Marina Bertoncin and Andrea Pase
Dipartimento di Scienze Storiche, Geografiche e dell’Antichità, Università di Padova, via del Santo 26,
35123, Italy
Correspondence to: Andrea Pase (andrea.pase@unipd.it)
Received: 2 December 2016 – Revised: 16 March 2017 – Accepted: 2 May 2017 – Published: 13 June 2017
Abstract. From the colonial era up to the present, mega-irrigation projects for agriculture have played a key
role in the production of state space in Sahelian Africa. Transferring a concept proposed by Agnew (1994)
onto a different scale, it is possible to interpret these mega-projects as “territorial traps”. In fact, they set up
boundaries (physical, relational, cognitive and operative) that force evolutive trajectories of the areas involved
along rigid pathways. In the aftermath of the systematic failure of the mega-projects, farmers are faced with
constraints determined by the trap imposed, without having any of the promised benefits in terms of productive
growth, i.e. income. In many situations, the farmers have identified “a means of escape” from these catastrophes
by transgressing the boundaries imposed by the territorial traps and reintroducing parts of the infrastructure
to a common use. The case study traces the crisis, and ultimately the failure, of the mega-irrigation projects
constructed in the 1970s along the shores of Lake Chad in Nigeria.
1 Introduction
“Territorial trap” was defined in 1994 by Agnew in a seminal
article that has left its mark on contemporary political geog-
raphy debates (Agnew, 1994, 2010, 2015; Brenner and El-
den, 2009; Reid-Henry, 2010; Newman, 2010; Elden, 2010,
2013; Shah, 2012). According to Agnew, the advent of the
modern territorial state involves three geographical assump-
tions: sovereignty is defined in territorial terms (the state
is understood as a unitary stable sovereign space); political
space is polarized between internal and external (between the
internal policy of the state and the international); and the state
becomes a uniform container of the society. These assump-
tions, which may seem at the same time essential and taken
for granted, have instead created an intellectual trap by losing
sight of the need for other modalities different from a terri-
torial state, such as considering and studying political space
as networks/flows and place making (Agnew, 2015). Since
then, many ways have been proposed to escape this trap in
order to be able to confront with more intellectual freedom
the forms of political institutions on a global scale.
In this article, we are adopting the metaphor of Agnew,
which is effective, yet we are proposing a shift: to transfer the
concept of territorial trap from a general viewpoint of mod-
ern political space and international relations into a different
spatial setting – the internal one.
The transposition of territorial trap into a different dimen-
sion seems justified, keeping in mind that double movement,
according to Lefebvre (1991), establishes the production of
state space: it acts to place space on a homogenous unitary
grid and, at the same time, it determines fragmentation of
space. The production of modern political space – the state
– follows the principals of “Hobbesian spatial logic” (Galli,
2001:28). It is an “abstract space” (Lefebvre, 1974; Stanek,
2008) made “smooth” through the removal of any previous
social content or of any possible autonomy. This abstract
space is “odd”: “It is at once homogeneous and compart-
mentalized. It is also simultaneously limpid and deceptive;
in short, it is fraudulent” (Lefebvre, 1991:310). So, one can
say that this abstract space is fraudulent, exactly as a trap.
It has a double character, both homogeneous and fractured:
“Under its homogeneous aspect, space abolishes distinction
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and differences . . . simultaneously, this same space is frag-
mented and fractured, in accordance with the demands of the
division of labour and the division of needs and functions”
(Lefebvre, 355). The cancellation of internal differences al-
lows for the creation of political–territorial unity: the states,
abstract homogenous spaces internally and yet similar from
a political–logical point of view can, in this way, be mutually
recognized on the international relations scene. Simultane-
ously, the state fragments the internal space into smaller units
and creates a hierarchy between them. This further leads to
“discrete, integrated, bounded, and coherent” units, intended
to naturalize and to conceal the intervention of the state on
society, besides providing “sites for capitalist accumulation”
and containers adapted for political–economic development
(Brenner and Elden, 2009:369).
Although up to now the discussion regarding the state ter-
ritorial trap has been mainly focused on the first movement
(the production of a political space that is abstract and ho-
mogenous), we believe it is likewise interesting to investigate
the second movement concerning internal fragmentation.
In particular, our specific reference is hydro-agricultural
mega-projects in the Sahelian area. Mega-projects (Gellert
and Lynch, 2003:15–16) transform space “rapidly, inten-
tionally, and profoundly in very visible ways, and require
coordinated applications of capital and state power. They
use heavy equipment and sophisticated technologies usu-
ally imported from the Global North and require coordinated
flows of international finance capital”. Specifically, the large-
scale Sahelian irrigation schemes consist of infrastructures
for water catchment (dams, pumping stations) and for dis-
tribution through networks of canals that allow for irriga-
tion over extensive areas, with the clear objective of guar-
anteeing agricultural production in hostile climatic condi-
tions (scarcity and uncertainty of precipitation). As Saut-
ter affirms (1987:5), “Hydro-agricultural interventions have
value as quasi-experimental objects” because from them “au-
tonomous operational realities emerge that can be individ-
ualized and delimitated”. The mega-dimension exalts these
characteristics, bringing even more into evidence the new
“techno-spatial order”. Precisely for this reason, the “spec-
tacular developments” and the “vast irrigation networks” are
favoured by governments (Sautter, 1987:9).
The era of mega-irrigation projects in Sahel began in colo-
nial times with Gezira (in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan), depart-
ing from the Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile (Gaitskell, 1959;
Barnett, 1977), and with the Niger Office in French Sudan,
departing from the Markala dam on the Niger River (Mora-
bito, 1977, 1995). Two other great Sahelian hydraulic sys-
tems were also involved during the colonial era, the Senegal
river (Maïga, 1995) and Lake Chad (Bouquet, 1990; Magrin,
2009; Bertoncin and Pase, 2012), although on a smaller scale.
The aim of the projects was to bring what the French colo-
nizers called mise en valeur, meaning to exploit colonial re-
sources to reinforce the economy of the colonial countries:
the most evident was Gezira, which supplied cotton for the
English textile industry.
With independence irrigated areas continued to expand:
the aim of the independent states was to ensure food self-
sufficiency or, at least, in the regions that were afflicted the
most by famine, to safeguard food security for its people. But
there were clear political reasons (to legitimize the young
states by consolidating the visibility within the space) and
economic motivations (to develop market economies for ex-
portation). Between the 1960s and the 1980s, it seems there
was a rapid expansion of schemes: large dams multiplied,
such as Roseires on the Blue Nile or Manantali on a tributary
of Senegal. It should be clarified that agricultural irrigation in
Sahel is not limited to state mega-projects. In fact, over time
other interventions appeared with yet other dimensions, such
as small-scale village irrigation projects, and with other ac-
tors such as NGOs or private investors. Choices such as size,
technologies, types of production and forms of management
are so diversified that different pathways are created which
are dependent on the geographical context, social conditions,
markets, governments and international development agency
decisions. In this regard, Kuper (2011) identifies three dis-
tinct phases: the first (from the 1960s to the early 1980s) is
noted as the peak of top-down mega-irrigation; the second
(1980s–1990s) moves towards community capacity-building
in a bottom-up approach, which then, at the turn of the mil-
lennium, lead to a “new narrative founded on markets”. In
the most recent phase, there is, on the one hand, a spread-
ing of large investments, above all by foreigners, in Sahelian
land (water and land grabbing) and, on the other hand, an un-
controlled proliferation of individual initiatives of small en-
trepreneurs which then generates a risk of over-exploitation
and conflicts in the appropriation of the resources.
In any case, for a long time the mega-project was a ref-
erence model for the expansion of agricultural irrigation in
the Sahel and, for the purposes of our study, it was a type of
hydro-agricultural intervention that permitted us to highlight
the role of the states and the territorial and cultural transfor-
mations that it brought about. Pascon (1978) so evocatively
described it as a passage “of water from the sky to water of
the state”.
These irrigation mega-projects are bounded territorial
units. Although on a reduced scale, the projects conformed
homogeneously within the state territory: (1) they defined
regulatory limits (Boone, 2014, defined it as “statist land
tenure regime”); (2) they established a clear separation be-
tween internal and external; and (3) they functioned as a con-
tainer for economic and social processes (in that the con-
tainer gave form to these processes). There is, therefore,
a clear similarity of function between the two movements
of homogeneousness and fragmentation of space: they both
constitute a territory.
With this now clear, we can investigate how these territo-
rial units “entrap” space, society and the economy and which,
consequently, determine their path of development. In other
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words, we can try to understand “how the territorial trap is
actually constructed and reproduced, whether in social sci-
ence, statecraft, politics or everyday life” (Brenner and El-
den, 2009:354).
The boundaries of the mega-projects – the physical fea-
tures, the relational, the cognitive and the operative – be-
come fixed and are maintained over time. In this process, the
projects acquire the characteristics of obduracy and stability
as defined by Hommels (2005) in his discussion of cities in
the STS studies.
At this point it becomes important to understand how these
territorial traps function. In the second section, we will pro-
pose some theoretical reflections on irrigation projects un-
derstood as territorial traps, which will be interpreted utiliz-
ing the category of “apparatus” proposed by Foucault (1994)
and recalled by Agamben (2009). In the third section, the
modalities for the planning, implementation and organization
of the mega-irrigation projects are analysed. In order to ob-
serve first hand how a territorial trap is constructed, a case
study of the irrigation schemes in the region of Lake Chad
(Borno, Nigeria) was selected (Bertoncin and Pase, 2012,
2015). In the fourth section, through an historical reconstruc-
tion of what happened during these projects, one comes to
understand how rapidly it steered them to the path of failure
(Hirschman, 1967; Scott, 1998). Finally in the fifth section, a
discussion follows as to what measures the farmers managed
to put into place to escape from the territorial trap. The re-
cent thoughts of Agamben (2015) on the crisis of (political)
action and the possible means of escape contributed to our
analysis.
2 Irrigation projects, apparatuses of development,
territorial traps
The mega-irrigation projects are an example of a “develop-
ment apparatus” (Ferguson, 1990; Sidaway, 2007) set into
place through the systematic application of scientific exper-
tise and by the organization and technical competence com-
ing from the Global North, all of which are established in or-
der to accelerate the modernization process in contexts con-
sidered backward.
It seems useful to examine in more depth the concept of
“apparatus” as defined by Agamben (2009). The author be-
gins with a 1977 interview of Foucault. In a crucial passage,
Foucault confirms that an apparatus is a network of connec-
tions that is present in various heterogeneous elements (dis-
courses, institutions, physical structures, rules and scientific
proposals): “A kind of a formation, so to speak, that at a given
historical moment has as its major function the response to
an urgency. The apparatus therefore has a dominant strate-
gic function . . . which means that we are speaking about a
certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a rational and
concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as
to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them,
to stabilize theme, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus
always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise from
it and, to an equal degree, condition it” (Foucault, 1994, in
Agamben, 2009:2, our italics).
In the irrigation mega-projects, all of the following charac-
teristics exist. (1) They are made up of many heterogeneous
elements connected in a network of relationships that enable
them to function productively (discourses related to develop-
ment and modernization, board and management structures;
farmer associations for allottees, etc.; dams, canals, pump-
ing stations, rules for the use of water and agricultural man-
agement; and assumptions by agronomic, pedologic and hy-
draulic sciences). (2) They have a historical function by re-
sponding to an urgency (in reality very urgent, which trans-
forms itself over time, such as the colonial mise en valeur, the
food self-sufficiency of the independent states, then the food
security of its populations and the humanitarian emergency
during the great droughts, and nowadays the climate change
and the implementation of the capacity for resiliency). (3)
They evolved from power relationships (between the state
and the local society, among officials, technicians, allottees,
etc.). (4) They are founded on a specific knowledge that
marginalizes others (modern vs. traditional knowledge; for-
mal knowledge vs. informal/tacit).
Agamben examines in more depth the Foucauldian pro-
posal by suggesting “a general and massive partitioning of
beings into two large groups or classes: on the one hand, liv-
ing beings (or substances) and, on the other, apparatuses in
which living beings are incessantly captured” (2009:13, our
italics). Therefore, an apparatus is “literally anything that has
in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, in-
tercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours,
opinions, or discourses of living beings” (2009:14, our ital-
ics).
In the citations of Foucault and of Agamben (we have
highlighted them in italics), there is a repetition of the verbs
to block, to capture and to intercept, reverting back – through
another means – to the metaphor of a trap. In fact, the defi-
nition of trap is exactly that of an “apparatus that allows for
capture”. Assuming this point of view, we can thereby affirm
that a mega-irrigation project functions as a trap: one that in-
tercepts and blocks space, relationships, knowledge and or-
ganizations.
In order to comprehend the diverse components of the Sa-
helian mega-projects as territorial traps, we thought it would
be useful to make a distinction between the two different lev-
els. The first level refers to territorial characteristics and the
second to the functional modality of the trap.
At the first level – from a territorial perspective – two fun-
damental aspects are evidenced: the physical and the rela-
tional. First and foremost is the physical dimension: they are
clearly defined spaces where the transformative capability of
modern technology radically modifies the profile of the land,
the hydrographical network and the vegetation in order to set
in place a geometrical partition of space and the total con-
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trol of whatever enters or leaves (water, people, production).
Then there is the relational dimension: the territory of the
project is the go-between for specific political and social re-
lations. The mega-project is a space where modern institu-
tions act (the state, the ministers, the corps of technical assis-
tants, international construction companies and international
aid organizations) and, in this way, marginalize and delegit-
imize the local institutions (for example, traditional elders),
who are viewed as irrelevant, if not as an obstacle, to mod-
ernization. The former have written rules, legal statutes and
formalized procedures; in contrast, the second are based on
customs that are not legally recognized or, if they are, only
considered as an auxiliary function, a procedure that appears
to outsiders as confusing and unclear. The roles and the po-
sitions of power determined by the hierarchy of the project
invalidated the roles and positions of local authority. These
institutional roles were set up to “mediate” and to deal with
power relationships between individuals within the territory.
From the point of view of how the apparatus functions,
understood as a trap, there are two other essential aspects:
the cognitive and the operative dimension.
Concerning the cognitive dimension, a project is estab-
lished through scientific expertise coming from the Global
North that marginalizes local knowledge relative to the soil,
to the water and to ways of cultivating and of extracting re-
sources from the environment (for example, fishing or tran-
shumance). Then there is the operative dimension that fol-
lows functional procedures and practices: water shifts, im-
position of monocultures or of specific crop rotation, deci-
sions regarding the agricultural calendar and control over the
stages of production. Whatever happens within the perimeter
of the project, such as agricultural practices and the transfor-
mation of products, is determined and imposed from above.
In this way, the territorial trap is deployed (Table 1): the
water is dammed and channelled into geometric networks
whose distribution is regulated in time and quantity; the roles
tied to the project focus on power plays that, at least initially,
are binding and not negotiable; and local expertise and tra-
ditional practices are excluded from the mega-projects. The
trap worked, and the intruder – whoever or whatever did not
conform to the modern agricultural plan – was thrown out:
the floods, the wetlands, the local institutions, the knowl-
edge embedded in the land and in the resources, and the agri-
cultural, pastoral and fishery practices of the populations. In
the meantime, all those that are part of the project from the
technicians to the allottees, although with varying degrees of
power, are in turn captured: totally dependent on the project
than can fire them or can take away their land.
Even if the period of the mega state-operated irrigation
schemes in Sahelian Africa, which began in colonial times,
had reached its apex between the 1960s and the 1980s, this
does not mean that the mega-project per se is dead. Today
it still represents an example of major investment in land
projects with foreign capital, often in alliance with national
investors. It has redefined the role of the state from being the
main protagonist to one of a “facilitator” for investments. It
is possible to observe this phenomenon in Mali at the Office
of Niger (for example Malibya) or along the Nile in Sudan
(Quatrida, 2015; Bertoncin et al., 2017).
In the next section, we analyse a case study of irrigation
projects interpreted as territorial traps.
3 The irrigation mega-projects of Lake Chad (Borno
State, Nigeria): how a territorial trap is put into
place
The diffusion of irrigation schemes is a vast phenomenon; so
daunting that one can distinguish it as one of the principal
factors responsible for the spatial transformation of Sahelian
Africa. Precisely for the breadth of the areas concerned and
for the multiple national contexts involved, the time and the
modalities of implementation of the irrigation schemes in the
four major hydrographic basins (the Senegal, Niger, Nile and
Lake Chad) differed. Our field research covered a span of
more than 20 years, from Senegal up to Sudan. In particular,
our research concentrated on the region of Lake Chad. It be-
gan in 2000 and continues up to the present time, involving
all four of the countries along its borders1. We investigated
the origin and the development of Sahelian agricultural ir-
rigation through semi-structured interviews which included
field observations and were repeated over time (with tech-
nicians, supervisors and workers of the projects; the allot-
tees; the farmers, breeders and customary heads of areas near
the projects; merchants; workers of international organiza-
tions and NGOs; representatives of farmer associations; col-
leagues at regional universities and research specialist cen-
tres, etc.). Our documentation included grey literature, maps,
photographs and iconographic illustrations. With all these
contributions, we decided to focus our attention on this spe-
cific case study in order to understand concretely the pro-
cesses that were put into place. In our opinion, the case study
taken into consideration is particularly significant because of
the mega-dimension of the project. The installation, which
took place in a very short period of time, introduced a vast
range of advanced technologies in a peripheral area without
any previous experience with modern irrigation. These char-
acteristics gave us the possibility to expose and to provide
evidence for the construction and operative procedures of a
territorial trap.
In the 1970s an intense program for the extension of irriga-
tion schemes (Fig. 1) was developed in the land surrounding
Lake Chad in the state of Borno (Adams, 1991; Bertoncin
and Pase, 2012, 2015; Blench, 1997). From 1970 to 1984
Nigeria, thanks to income gained through petroleum produc-
tion, had significant resources available that they could also
direct towards the modernization of agriculture. In the north-
1At this time the absence of even a minimum standard for safety
and security made it impossible to access a large area that was part
of our research in the region.
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Table 1. The irrigation projects as territorial traps.
Physical
dimension
Relational
dimension
Cognitive
dimension
Operative
dimension
Type of closure The network of canals,
barriers and check
points, administrative
and operational centres,
and new settlements:
the
physical closure
The projects’ institu-
tions, the social role
s that derive from them
(who commands, who
monitors, who obeys):
the relational closure
Survey, feasibility
studies, topographic
and thematic maps: the
cognitive closure
Organizational pro-
cedure (who does
what and when): the
operative closure
Who/what is
included
“Useful” water,
crop selection,
allottees/technicians
and officials
Relationships initiated
with the project and
functional to it (verti-
cal or horizontal); writ-
ten rules
Technical and scientific
expertise
Agricultural
modernization: produc-
tion organization, pro-
cessing and marketing
of product
Who/what is
excluded
Floods, wetlands;
vegetation and natu-
ral fauna/local crop
varieties; villages;
herds
Local social and politi-
cal relations; customs
Contextual/tacit
knowledge
Polyculture, trans-
humance, other produc-
tive and commercial
practices
The trap in action:
who/what is stan-
dardized? How it is
standardized?
Geometric partition
of the space (canals,
fields, roads), water
regulation, levelling
of land, planning of
production spaces and
settlements
Governing of relations:
command and control
Forced/imposed learn-
ing; vulgarization (dif-
fused through simplifi-
cation) of modern ex-
pertise
Water shifts, techniques
and timing of agricul-
tural operations
eastern region, an ambitious territorial plan was designed that
responded to the rapid, non-regulated urban expansion of the
capital in Maiduguri. The plan was to develop agricultural ir-
rigation in order to resettle a sizeable part of the population
and to consolidate the local economy in what was consid-
ered a strategic area along the borders. At the same time, the
heavy droughts of 1973 and 1984 affected the Sahelian re-
gion. On the one hand, these droughts made the irrigation
projects even more crucial; on the other hand, they caused
serious problems.
The main area of interest was the zone along the shore of
the lake where water could be drawn when necessary through
intake channels. In particular, there were three planned in-
terventions: two “polders” (areas of seasonal flooding from
the lake that needed to be contained by dams to “defend it”
from the overflow of the lake) and a major irrigation scheme
further back from the shores of the lake. The two twin pold-
ers needed to have 20 000 ha of extension: only one of the
two was actually started, the Baga Polder, while the second
one, the Kirenowa Polder, was not able to pass the feasi-
bility study. As concerns the first polder, it was designed in
1973 for the Baga Kawa area. Construction began in 1977: a
sheet of iron 32 km long was constructed in order to protect
the area from the seasonal flooding of the lake. A 13.5 km
channel conducted water from the lake. In this area, flood-
recession agriculture was practiced on a small scale in ad-
dition to rainfed cultivations; it became more relevant after
the drought of 1973 and particularly after that of 1984. Ac-
tivities such as livestock transhumance and fishing were also
important.
Indisputably, the South Chad Irrigation Project (SCIP) de-
signed in 1972 (Fig. 2) was the most significant (Adam,
2004; Bertoncin and Pase, 2012; Blench, 1997; Kalawole,
1987, 1988; Ogunbameru, 1986). The area decided upon was
a plain made up of thick layers of clay with irregular strands
of sand and lime, annually affected by flooding from the
smaller tributaries of the lake, the Yedseram and the Ebeji.
About 28 000 acres were used for traditional cultivation even
though the land actually cultivated depended on the level
of seasonal floods. Above all, transplanted grain sorghum
(musakwa) was cultivated. Traditional methods of contain-
ment and conservation of water of the land testifies to the fact
that the local farmers were capable irrigators. In the sandy
humps, millet, onions, okra and peanuts were grown. Work-
ing in the fields was socially accepted, even though the hard-
est work was willingly entrusted to external workers. Tra-
ditional elders regulated the task of assigning land parcels.
Cattle investment was a privilege above all other forms of
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Figure 1. Irrigation projects surrounding Lake Chad with their
main channels as planned in the early 1970s by the Chad Basin De-
velopment Authority (CBDA). Only a small part of this ambitious
plan was accomplished.
accumulation of wealth. Fishing was integrated with cultiva-
tion and breeding. There were 18 villages in the area. The
principal ones were Marte, Missene and Ala with a com-
bined population of about 8500. The intensely cultivated
plain seemed dotted with trees: the idea that appeared to de-
velopers was that this was a place that exhibited a positive
path of integration between human activities and environ-
mental resources settled over a long period of time. A survey
carried out during the feasibility studies (1971–73) claimed
that it had an environmental “sensitivity”, which encapsu-
lated man–nature relationships. It appeared to be a “devel-
oped” and “self-sufficient” area with regard to food require-
ments and artefacts of primary need, something to absolutely
maintain (FAO, 1973).
The SCIP needed to take advantage of the potential irri-
gating of Lake Chad by keeping all the suitable land within
the perimeter, thus passing from one to two harvests a year.
The agricultural mechanization, electrification and the indus-
trial manufacturing and marketing of products on a regional
scale were the cornerstones of intervention. The basic har-
vests were wheat, rice and cotton. Other than the construction
of channels and a system of pumping stations and installa-
tions for the processing of products, a plan was put into place
for setting up settlements and for establishing a network of
roads operating to unite the territory, without forgetting that
it would provide a connection to the state capital, Maiduguri.
It was expected that the combined population would grow in
2010 to 220 000 (where originally there were only 10 000).
The project was divided into three parts, to be completed one
after the other. The first phase, which began in 1975, pro-
vided for the building of the main infrastructures: a 29 km
Figure 2. South Chad Irrigation Project (SCIP). Only Stage I and
parts of Stage II were actually implemented.
intake channel that would reach the principal pumping sta-
tion at Kirinowa. From there the main canal of 13 km would
arrive at the pumping station at Gadadai, which in turn would
pump and distribute water through a gravity network.
In our interpretation these two projects (Baga Polder
and SCIP) functioned as territorial traps. Our analysis will
demonstrate how the four dimensions as identified in Sect. 2
– the physical, relational, cognitive and operative – were im-
plicated in the construction of these apparatuses.
First and foremost, these irrigation schemes define a pre-
cise physical space: the iron barrier of the Baga Polder is the
most evident example. The riverbanks and the canal networks
distinctly separate what is inside from what is outside. On
the inside, only what is provided for and established as nec-
essary for agro-industrial production is allowed: the offices,
the warehouses and the “modern” villages where the allottees
live. All is new and modern, beginning with the recently built
SCIP central office situated in New Marte. The water from
the lake is distributed according to scheduled timetables and
the means predefined by predetermined channels and pump-
ing stations in order to have water where, how much and
when it is needed. The natural floods are kept outside. In
this way, only certain crops could be cultivated, wheat and
rice above all. Traditional crops were banned. Herds were
kept on the outside and moved away from their habitual graz-
ing lands. In 1977, a most significant observation was made
by a French geographer, Bouquet, who visited the village of
Allagarno in the area of Baga (1990 II:195). He described
how the kulo-sadié, the recessional agriculture fields of the
village, were abandoned by the farmers. The year before “a
group of topographers belonging to the Baga Polder Project
came and marked off with sticks the area usually occupied by
the kulo-sadié of Allagarno without giving them any com-
pensation or explaining to the farmers the reasons behind
their actions” (Bouquet, 1990 II:195). From that time, the
farmers did not want to return to their fields so as not to re-
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move the sticks and not to be forced to work on land “poi-
soned by the products of progress”. Even before the begin-
ning of the project, when only the sticks marked off the area,
the process of excluding traditional cultivation had already
begun. The physical boundary even worked when it had not
yet been erected.
Secondly, new power relationships are established: rela-
tional boundaries are formed and dominated by powerful ac-
tors (Bertoncin and Pase, 2012). The managers, the techni-
cians and the experts occupy all the positions of power in
the irrigation scheme. An iron discipline is imposed and the
chain of command is very clear. The organizational hierar-
chy reverberates in the social hierarchy: the visible signs (the
automobiles, the houses larger and beautiful, etc.) are char-
acteristic of the board. Only the functional relationships of
the projects are accepted. Family relationships and ethnic
groups are excluded. The allottees are only chess pawns in
the project: the workforce. Their particularities are not taken
into consideration or have any value: not their ethnic origins,
opinions, working skills or even food preferences. The writ-
ten rules for the operating procedures of the project are not
open for discussion. No possibility is given to them to refer
back to personal values and different customs. The relational
boundary is well defined: everyone knows who commands
and everyone knows the rules.
Thirdly, the projects delimit a cognitive boundary. Modern
techno-scientific expertise is mobilized right from the survey
phase: studies regarding demography, pedology, hydrology,
climatology, agronomy and economics record and classify
all the data. Project construction is entrusted to engineers
in the West. The operation of the project is based on mod-
ern agronomic knowledge, utilizing agricultural equipment,
electricity, etc. Foreign technicians are summoned to begin
the project. In particular, all local expertise is excluded, all
the knowledge regarding the land, the rhythm of water and
the cultivable species that are developed over time by the in-
habitants. The tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966) that is able to
create a positive relationship within the environment, which
even the surveys recognized, is not taken into consideration
at all.
Finally, the projects set up an operational boundary. Every-
one within the scheme has a role to play, a job to do. Every-
one inside the scheme has predetermined schedules, rigidly
timed. Ploughing of the fields, seeding, fertilizing, clean-
ing out the weeds, harvesting and with supervision against
granivorous birds: all is timed and controlled from above.
The allottees are obliged to carry out their work according
to the field inspectors’ instructions. In particular, the water
timetable has to be rigorously respected in order to avoid un-
even distribution and difficulty of distribution. If the allottees
have difficulty in carrying out their roles, they are accused of
being lazy and can be replaced in the next season. In other
words, what local farmers do well (polyculture, the integra-
tion among different activities such as agriculture, breeding
and fishing) are undesired in the project and considered an
obstacle.
Analysis of the four dimensions (physical, relational, cog-
nitive and operative) confirms that these projects are clearly
territorial traps as defined in Sect. 2: the projects entrap the
local people and the farmers by delimitating specific paths
for development and excluding any alternative. On many oc-
casions (not only here but also in other areas of our research),
the farmers commented: “We are prisoners of the project”.
They feel entrapped by an organizational structure that forces
specific production and cultivation practices but without giv-
ing them adequate support. In the next section, the results of
these projects – not positive – will be presented, seeking to
understand whether one of the reasons for their failure is that
they are indeed territorial traps.
4 How territorial traps are dismantled
In colloquial language, “trap” has a particular meaning. In
fact, it can be used to refer to any mechanism that performs
poorly or does not live up to the expectations of its user. It is
curious that a device that is as potentially as dangerous as a
trap (that imprisons, immobilizes, restrains and subjects the
ones captured to the will of the constructor) becomes another
way of saying failure, for something is not working or that
blocks itself.
The irrigation projects of Borno also become traps in
this particular interpretation. They do not function and com-
pletely fail expectations.
Both projects were conceived as a means of taking advan-
tage of the water draining from the lake through intake chan-
nels. But Lake Chad is mutable and unpredictable. Not very
deep (no more than 3 or 4 m), the surface of this endorheic
basin varies rapidly depending on how much water drains
out from the overflow of the Chari River, its principal tribu-
tary (88 % of the intake derives from this river). In as much
as the floods are extremely variable, the borders of the lake
fluctuate in continuation, so much so that, in effect, there are
three Chad lakes, depending on the level of water: the Small,
the Medium and the Great Chad (Lemoalle, 2015). In the
20th century, the Small and Medium Chad alternated. The
projects were designed for the conditions that existed at the
level of Medium Chad in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the
1970s and 1980s were characterized by severe droughts and
the lake rapidly switched to Small Chad.
In regards to Baga Polder, the irrigation network that was
set up covered overall only 1700 ha. The planned pumping
station was never constructed and the project served only
for temporary installations. In 1982, 400 ha were distributed
among 100 production units. The last harvest was in 1983.
In 1984, during a severe year of drought, water no longer
reached the intake channel.
For SCIP it became necessary to extend the intake channel
from the original 29 to 39 km in order to be able to irrigate
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the fields beyond the receding lake. Work began for phase
1 in 1975: of the 22 000 ha programmed, 18 000 were effec-
tively prepared for cultivation. Rice was the first harvest in
1979. Phase 2 began in 1978 where the main infrastructures
prepared 27 000 ha but only 4000 were sown. The third phase
remained only on paper as a hypothesis.
In the fields that were functioning, production progres-
sively increased from 1979 to 1984. The peak harvest of
10 000 ha was reached in the 1983–1984 season with 3145
employed workers. The drastic recession of the lake, how-
ever, drained the structures that supplied water. Of the
14 000 ha cultivated for the following season, almost to ex-
orcize the advancement of a negative trend, nothing was
harvested. The project stopped. When the water returned in
1988, the structures that were left inactive for such a long
time were no longer working effectively. Much of the im-
ported technology was too sophisticated and the impractical-
ity of its usage had not survived during the period of inter-
ruption. Putting the machines back into productivity would
have required important investments, which did not arrive.
From time to time in the years that followed, the pumps were
reactivated to irrigate areas of land that were, however, al-
ways more reduced (Adam, 2004; Bertoncin and Pase, 2012;
Blench, 1997; Kalawole, 1987, 1988).
A presumption that is taken for granted is that the reces-
sion of water from the lake was responsible for the failure
of these two projects. In reality, contemporaneous with the
effects of drought, another factor played an important part
in the breakdown of these projects: the economic crisis due
to the drastic reduction of income from petroleum, which
consequently lead to the abandonment of the modernization
projects for agriculture by the Nigerian government. More-
over, other critical elements for failure were shared with the
vast majority of other Sahelian irrigation mega-projects: in
fact, some authors talk about “systematic failures” of the
projects (Scott, 1998, 2010; Ika, 2005). Besides these con-
comitant causes, such as market fluctuations or diminished
resources at the states’ disposal due to the financial crisis, it
is possible to identify at least three internal causes for the
failure. The first regards the “shortsidedness” of the mod-
ern agricultural planning (Scott, 2010) and the incapacity to
see what is happening outside of the boundaries of a nar-
row spatial and temporal horizon. It was not able to evaluate
the negative effects that existed outside the perimeters of the
projects (for example pollution of the water or removal of
water for other usage, impact on local power structures, etc.)
or over time (soil degradation, cost of maintenance, etc.). The
second internal cause is the underestimation of the intrinsic
fragility of complex systems and the strong interrelationship
between the constitutive elements: the “various components
are difficult to fit into place at the same moment: besides the
construction of the irrigation works, land has to be distributed
and settled, new crops have to be grown and new markets
found” (Hirschman, 1967:43). The third internal cause is the
repetitiousness of the work model “copy and paste” in dif-
ferent realities, and the consequent incapacity to engage in
a dialogue with diverse geographical and social situations.
In a general sense, what is put into place by developers is
a drastic simplification of the basic theories taken from sci-
ence, modern agronomic technology and social engineering
and which were then applied to the Sahelian land and peo-
ple. This “one-commodity machine” (Scott, 2010) charac-
teristic of the mega-irrigation projects is precisely based on
a “heroic simplification” of the reality it imposed. The dif-
ferent boundaries of the territorial trap (physical, relational,
cognitive and operative) create a very rigid structure: dams,
dikes, embankments to contain the floods, perimeters around
the fields, etc.; fixed organizational and social roles and cen-
tralized management; selection of “useful” expertise and the
imposition of modern technology; and monoculture and con-
stricting agronomic practices. The instruments of develop-
ment are so systematically constraining and are not able to
adapt to the changeable climatic conditions and adverse po-
litical and economic situations of the Sahelian states (Kala-
wole, 1989). The projects have revealed themselves to be ef-
fectively “traps”: their mechanisms are jammed, the cages
can no longer imprison and the boundaries can no longer ex-
clude.
The rigidity of the territorial traps is opposite to what tran-
spired in the traditional rural spaces that were characterized
by mobility and flexibility (Gallais, 1984; Adams, 1993; Re-
taillé and Walther, 2011). The Sahelian population’s response
to the uncertainty of climatic conditions was elaborated over
time and was tied to a form of use of resources that is both
flexible and mobile: polyculture, burnbeating and itinerant
cultivation, recessional agriculture, transhumance livestock
breeding and integration with different activities such as fish-
ing and craftsmanship. They are customs that adapt them-
selves more rapidly to market dynamics and are decisively
more autonomous compared with political conventions. For
every location and varying climatic condition that they face
(such as drought, heavy rains, etc.), choices are made based
on the most adaptable way to use the resources: tacit knowl-
edge is activated, which is deeply embedded in specific situ-
ations.
During the continual crisis phases of the mega-
development projects, the local people attempt to over-
come the rigidity imposed by the irrigation schemes by re-
establishing – through breaking the rules – those practices,
the expertise and those relationships that were drastically
abolished by the developers. For example, cultivated areas
spread outside the project (yet using water from the project);
the agronomic input (such as fertilizers) provided by techni-
cians is used in the bush; ever more frequent illegal grazing
exists within the irrigation borders; and fishing is practiced
by closing the canals (Bertoncin and Pase, 2012).
The failure of these mega-projects also meant the collapse
of one of the most expansive planning and regional develop-
ment projects that had begun in the 1970s: the expectation
for what was to be modernization of agriculture and state
Geogr. Helv., 72, 243–254, 2017 www.geogr-helv.net/72/243/2017/
M. Bertoncin and A. Pase: Interpreting mega-development projects as territorial traps 251
intervention turned into distrust and uncertainty. Indeed this
failure is just one of any number of explanations for the com-
plex economic and political crisis that afflicted the north-
eastern region in Nigeria since the turn of the millennium,
and specifically Borno. The outbreak of insurgency is tied in
particular to the politico-religious violence of Boko Haram
and to the consequent, and often indiscriminate, repression
of the police force and military (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014a,
b).
The last section will explain what happened after the fail-
ure of the irrigation projects of Borno and how the local peo-
ple try to escape from these territorial traps.
5 Ubi fracassorium, ibi fuggitorium
Today the Baga Polder and the SCIP are stretched as far
as the eye can see with dark clay, cracked and dry, faintly
scarred from what remains of the irrigation network. Inside
the areas of the project improvised pumps irrigate a few hun-
dred hectares. In the lower zones, where water accumulates
from rainwater or inside the channels of the project, some
farmers have returned to cultivating musakwa, an off-season
grain. Many have emigrated somewhere else. Others have
remained and are waiting, up to now in vain, that the large
pumps will start up again.
However, after the great drought of the 1980s, the intake
channels have started working again. In fact, it is in this area
that agricultural activity has been the most productive. Along
the intake channels, the farmers have set up small pumps to
irrigate a variety of terrain. With the annual flooding from the
lake, the water inundates the surrounding land. From January,
the farmers begin to follow the floodwaters applying reces-
sional cultivation (Kalawole, 1988; Sarch and Birkett, 2000;
Bertoncin and Pase, 2012, 2015). In the dry season, small
motor pumps have appeared allowing for the possibility to
prolong land productivity and to bring the second season to
a close. The fruitful harvest is then transported to markets in
the state capital by utilizing the paths along the riverbanks
and using the roads constructed for the projects. During the
harmattan (dry) season, for tens of kilometres the two chan-
nels are flanked by irrigation cultivation that produces grains
and plants and are managed autonomously by the farmers.
The farmers have found a means of escape from the territo-
rial trap by reinventing the infrastructures set in place by the
project: planting where it was not expected, accessing water
where it was not allowed, growing what was not permitted,
utilizing the rivers banks as paths in order to reach the cul-
tivable land of the lake, and navigating the intake channels
with large canoes that allowed for exchanges with Chad and
Cameroon. With the parts of the project that remained after
the failure of the projects, the farmers knew how to reinvent
an unexpected usage. They transformed the disaster into an
opportunity. They re-appropriated their space, recuperating
their tacit knowledge and taking advantage of important ex-
pertise from the project (modern irrigation, new crops, etc.).
The mega-project demonstrated in this way obduracy, indeed
paradoxical: what remained was a point of departure for a
new direction.
With failure, the farmers generated innovative solutions.
As Pulcinella says, the renowned masqueraded Neapolitan
from the Commedia dell’Arte, “ubi fracassorium, ibi fuggi-
torium”: where there is catastrophe, there is also a means of
escape. In a recent work of Agamben (2015), reference is
made to the figure of Pulcinella. It begins with 104 plates
from an album of drawings by Giandomenico Tiepolo, all of
which are dedicated to the masqueraded Neapolitan and enti-
tled Pulcinella ovvero Divertimento per li regazzi. Pulcinella
(“A mask or a man? A god or a demon?”; Leogrande, 2015)
is for Agamben the symbolic figure from an era of catas-
trophe: “Pulcinella appears when politics die” (Leogrande,
2015). In fact, Tiepolo produced his album between 1793
and 1797, which at the time marked the end of the Repub-
lic of Venice but also the end of political life for the Vene-
tians. When facing a catastrophe, what matters is to search
for a means of escape: “The secret of Pulcinella is that, in
the comedy of life, there is no secret, but only, in each in-
stant, a way to escape” (Agamben, 2015:130). Precisely for
this reason Pulcinella is contemporary. Even today with the
domination of an economic and technological paradigm we
are in a time of catastrophe, or as is noted, an “eclipse of pol-
itics” (Agamben, 130). From this point of view, Pulcinella
represents “an expression of another politic”: “the paradigm
of the struggle that has monopolized political imagination
of modern times has to be substituted with that of escape”
(Agamben), as did the farmers of Borno. As Pulcinella, who
is both “inside and outside”, the farmers were also inside and
outside of the project, in and out of modern agricultural prac-
tices and in and out of the policies of development. In refer-
ence to the territorial trap, “What we are dealing with here is
the liberation of that which remains captured and separated
by means of apparatuses, in order to bring it back to a pos-
sible common use” (Agamben, 2009:17). The “profanation”
of apparatuses, using their component parts in a “desecrat-
ing” and “detached” way, compared to the model (Agamben,
2015), was the means for them to remove themselves from
the grip of the territorial trap. In this way, the farmers re-
establish a “possible common use” to what had been limited
by the boundaries of the project and usage that was with-
drawn from the local population.
Attempts by the local population to find new and au-
tonomous solutions for development clashed with the vio-
lence by the Islamic insurgency. The shores of the lake have
been directly involved over these last years in conflicts be-
tween Boko Haram Islamic militants and the military forces:
in particular, in April 2013 about 200 civilians were killed at
Baga Kawa as a reprisal after the death of a soldier at a check-
point. Warfare and seizure of arms took place many times in
the villages on the lake. From August 2014, many refugees
began to hide on some islands just over the border of Nige-
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ria and Chad to escape the violent clashes between the army
and rebels. In January 2015, the attack at Baga Kawa was
particularly serious and was carried out by Boko Haram. It
ended up destroying a large part of the area and some vil-
lages nearby. This situation makes it impossible to have the
latest reliable information as to what is happening in the area
of Baga Polder and of the SCIP (Pourtier, 2015; Seignobos,
2015), even if the news reported numerous raids and plun-
der of the cultivated fields in the SCIP zone (e.g. Daily Post
Nigeria, http://allafrica.com/stories/201306170476.html).
6 Conclusions
This paper sought to verify if it made any sense to transfer
the concept of territorial trap (Agnew, 1994) from a com-
prehensive interpretation of modern political space and in-
ternational relations onto a another scale (the internal one),
that of the territorial development in a state. In particular,
it proposed an interpretation of the Sahelian mega-irrigation
projects as apparatuses of development and, more precisely,
as territorial traps, further identifying four dimensions: phys-
ical, relational, cognitive and operative. In the selected case
study, in the state of Borno (Nigeria), the irrigation projects
clearly operated utilizing different boundaries, thus allowing
for the possibility to observe how territorial traps function.
The rigidity of the apparatuses was a determining factor in
the crisis. These failures dismantled the “territorial trap” and
left space for self-initiative on the part of the farmers, which
they in turn integrated with modern knowledge and tradi-
tional expertise. Paradoxically, the obduracy of the project
was maintained through the reutilization of some of its in-
frastructures in unexpected ways. We believe that the capa-
bility of the farmers “to desecrate the apparatus” (Agamben,
2009) and to find the “means of escape” (Agamben, 2015)
readdresses the need for a more general understanding of the
actual crisis in developmental policies and of the necessity to
overcome the “territorial traps”.
At the present time, the social and economic situation is
so gravely deteriorated in Borno that even the minimum con-
ditions for security and safety cannot be met. When these
do change and a new window for investment and develop-
ment is possible, the capabilities of the locals to find solu-
tions and to adapt agriculture to an ever-changing environ-
ment must be taken into consideration. Startlingly enough, it
seems that political decision makers persist with the idea of
eventual mega-interventions: proposals such as a water trans-
fer project from the Ubangi River to Lake Chad (Lemoalle
and Magrin, 2014:171–174; Magrin, 2016) or the ongoing
negotiations between the state of Niger and a Saudi private
company (Al Horaish) for the development of a 74 000 ha ir-
rigation project in the region of Diffa (Tchangari and Diori,
2016) demonstrate that the failures of the past are not being
taken into consideration.
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